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NOTES
TRUTH & BEAUTY, DECEPTION & DISFIGUREMENT: A
FEMINIST ANALYSIS OF BREAST IMPLANT LITIGATION
KERITH COHEN*
In her recent book, The Beauty Myth,' Naomi Wolf discusses
the phenomenon in which a woman links her identity to her
physical appearance. Wolf presents the beauty myth as a sequel
to the feminine mystique2 "discovered" by Betty Friedan.3 The
feminine mystique depicts happy womanhood as a "modern"
suburban housewife.4 The beauty myth, on the other hand, depicts
the modern happy woman as physically perfect. 5 "The beauty
myth tells a story: the quality called 'beauty' objectively and
universally exists. Women must want to embody it and men must
want to possess women who embody it."'
This Note explores how the beauty myth affects a female
plaintiffs recovery in a products liability action against manufac-
turers of products targeted toward women. Part I examines male
bias in the area of products liability and explains the beauty
myth, outlining the theoretical bases for the problem that im-
pedes women plaintiffs. Part II recounts the breast implant story,
including the marketing and testing of the devices, demonstrating
how male bias and the beauty myth fueled the implant industry
and contributed to the subsequent injuries and litigation. Part
III illustrates how the beauty myth disadvantages breast implant
plaintiffs on several levels. Part IV recommends a doctrinal
method to compensate for the effects of the beauty myth on
female plaintiffs who bring product liability actions, and identifies
various policy reasons for doing so. More specifically, Part IV
argues that courts should not apply the learned intermediary
* J.D. Candidiate 1995, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William & Mary.
B.A. 1990, Duke University. The author would like to thank Professor Paul A. LeBel,
Maureen P. Coffey, and Nathan S. Scott Epley.
1. NAOMI WOLF. THE BEAUTY MYTH: HOW IMAGES OF BEAUTY ARE USED AGAINST
WOMEN (1991).
2. BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963).
3. WOLF, supra note 1, at 16, 18, 21, 64-67. 168-69.
4. FRIEDAN, supra note 2, at 33-68.
5. See WOLF, supra note 1, at 15-16.
6. Id. at 12.
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doctrine in "failure to warn" claims against breast implant man-
ufacturers.
I. MALE BIAS AND THE BEAUTY MYTH
A. Women and Products Liability
Female mass tort plaintiffs encounter male bias in both the
legal and medical systems,7 and a recognition of systemic male
bias is crucial if female mass tort victims are to recover fully for
their injuries. That the Anglo-American legal system is male
created, and therefore male biased to the extent it often ignores
concerns and experiences traditionally labeled "female," is. not a
new concept and has received extensive treatment by legal scho-
lars Part of the problem with a system created exclusively by
one sex is that the creators used their own concerns, bodies, and
experiences as representative of the norm.9 Furthermore, this
presumption that the male is the norm often goes unstated. For
example, gender bias inheres in such ostensibly gender neutral
language as "the reasonable person. 10
To account for this underlying male bias, some courts have
narrowly applied a reasonable woman standard in sexual harass-
ment cases, as women are the usual victims in this area." Outside
7. See infra notes 8-53 and accompanying text.
8. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW (1987); see also Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV.
829 (1990) (seeking a feminist legal methodology); Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on
Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988) (exploring the influence of the
patriarchy on the tort system); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mainstreaming Feminist Legal
Theory, 23 PAC. L.J. 1493 (1992) (reviewing the history of feminist confrontation with
law); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988) (discussing the
construction of human beings by masculine jurisprudence).
9. Lucinda Finley, "Feminist Jurisprudence"-The 1990 Myra Bradwel Day Panel, 1
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 5, 17-18 (1991) (asserting that the dominant group is blind to its
own characteristics of race, gender, and sexuality); see Bender, supra note 8, at 16-19
(arguing that women are described in terms of their differences from men).
10. Bender, supra note 8, at 20-25.
11. Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 952 n.3 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting and
agreeing that the reasonable woman standard is appropriate in hostile environment
litigation under Title VII); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that
a female plaintiff states a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment
when she alleges conduct that a reasonable woman would consider creates an abusive
working environment); Yates v. AVCO Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987) (asserting
that it is only reasonable that the person standing in the shoes of a female employee
alleging sexual harassment should be a reasonable woman); Rabidue v. Osceola Refining
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the narrow realm of sexual harassment claims, however, the
unstated male norm remains pervasive.12 For example, legal scho-
lars have asserted that tort law focuses primarily on masculine
goals' s and marginalizes certain types of harms typically suffered
by women.14 More particularly, tort law has generally underval-
ued women and harms to their reproductive systems by not only
limiting their grounds for recovery, but also by undercompensat-
ing them for such injuries.' Mass torts involving DES 16 and the
Dalkon Shield 7 exemplify how women's reproductive systems are
often undervalued. 8
Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., dissenting) (concluding that the relevant
inquiry for offensive environment actions is whether the conduct complained of is offensive
to the reasonable woman), affid, 805 F.2d 611, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987), abrogated
on other grounds by Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993). But see Ellison,
924 F.2d at 884 (Stephens, J., dissenting) (asserting that "reasonable man" means an
average adult person regardless of gender, and that the reasonable woman standard
assumes men do not possess the same sensibilities as women); Robert Unikel, "Reasonable"
Doubts: A Critique of the Reasonable Woman Standard in American Jurisprudence, 87 Nw.
U. L. REV. 326 (1992) (criticizing the workability of the reasonable woman standard in
light of the inability of male judges and jurors to determine the qualities of a reasonable
woman without resorting to gender stereotypes).
12. See Bender, supra note 8, at 20-25 (asserting that "reason" and "reasonableness"
are themselves gendered concepts).
13. See generally Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis,
Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848 (proposing a new meaning
of legal responsibility grounded in feminist theory concepts of care, response, and
interdependency).
14. Finley, supra note 9, at 22-25 (arguing that the tort system compensates injuries
based on a market-referenced system, and thus undervalues women's reproductive ca-
pacity); Joan'E. Steinman, Women, Medical Care, and Mass Tort Litigation, 68 CHI-KENT
L. REV. 409 (1992) (suggesting that the attitudinal factors that disadvantage women in
the corporate and scientific fields also perpetuate and exacerbate the disadvantage women
face in the legal sphere); Stephanie M. Wildman, Review Essay: The Power of Women, 2
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 435 (1990) (pointing out several landmark tort cases that exemplify
the marginalization of abuse of women by men).
15. Finley, supra note 9, at 22-24; Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including
Women's Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEmIISM 41, 68 (1989); Menkel-Meadow,
supra note 8, at 1519-20; see SUSAN PERRY & Jim DAWSON, NIGHTMARE: WOMEN AND THE
DALKON SHIELD 207-08 (1985) (quoting U.S. District Court Judge Miles Lord's statement
to officials of A.H. Robins, manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield, "I dread to think what
would have been the consequences if the victims [of the Dalkon Shield] had been men
rather than women, women who seem through some strange quirk of our society's mores
to be expected to suffer pain, shame and humiliation.").
16. DES litigation involved a drug (diethylstilbestrol) administered to pregnant women
to prevent miscarriage. Thousands of women, daughters of the women who took the
drug, developed various types of rare cancers decades later. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott
Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 925 (Cal. 1980).
17. The Dalkon Shield is a contraceptive device inserted into a woman's uterus.
Thousands of women who used the Dalkon Shield suffered an array of injuries ranging
from pelvic inflammatory disease (PID) to infertility to death. See generally PERRY &
DAWSON, supra note 15.
18. Id.
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Male bias has traditionally influenced the characterization of a
female plaintiffs injuries, as when courts have described women's
physical injuries as psychological or hysterical.19 For example,
judges frequently have classified women's fright-based physical
injuries, such as miscarriages, as emotional harm.20 Scholars as-
sert that, historically, the medical system often dismissed wom-
en's complaints as emotional or hysterical, but commonly treated
men's complaints of identical harm as serious physical injury.21
As the legal system is hesitant to compensate emotional harm,
these women plaintiffs were often left uncompensated. 22
When women do recover for their injuries, they tend to recover
significantly lower compensatory damage awards than do men.23
Male bias in damage awards is especially evident when a woman's
reproductive system is injured.24 For example, the American
Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
Impairment25 lists a "whole person impairment" rating which is
up to ten percent greater for injuries to male sex organs than
for comparable injuries to female sex organs.21 Scholars also note
that damage awards are male biased in that they tend to under-
compensate women for loss of future income. Not only are juries
often swayed by gender stereotypes about employment, but in
reality women are often paid significantly less than men because
of employment discrimination.Y
19. Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fight: A
History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990).
20. Id. at 814, 823, 826-55 (presenting a gendered history of the law's treatment of
fright-based injuries); see, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896)
(denying recovery to plaintiff who lost consciousness and suffered a miscarriage after a
near miss by a horse car); Maube v. Warrington, 258 N.W. 497, 497 (Wis. 1935) (denying
recovery to plaintiff who became "extremely hysterical, sick and prostrated" and died
within one month of witnessing her daughter hit and killed by a negligent driver).
21. Finley, supra note 9, at 23; Finley, supra note 15, at 65; Steinman, supra note 14,
at 424.
22. Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 19, at 827; Finley, supra note 9. at 23 (pointing
to Payton v. Abbott Labs., 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982), in which the court dismissed
claims of DES-exposed plaintiffs because their injuries were classified as trivial emotional
harm).
23. NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE, THE PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE NINTH
CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE DISCUSSION DRAFT 175 (1992); Steinman, supra note 14,
at 424.
24. See generally PERRY & DAWSON, supra note 15.
25. GUIDES TO THE EVALUATION OF PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT (A. Engelberg ed., 3d ed.
1988).
26. Steinman, supra note 14, at 425; Ellen S. Pryor, Flawed Promises: A Critical
Evaluation of the American Medical Association's Guides to Permanent Impairment, 103
HARV. L. REV. 964 (1990) (book review).
27. Finley, supra note 15, at 51-52; Jane Goodman et al., Money, Sex & Death: Gender
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The manner in which the tort system handles mass tort cases
frequently limits the scope of a plaintiffs recovery.2 Professor
and feminist scholar Leslie Bender asserts that one function of
the legal system is to permit injured parties to tell their stories
and thus validate their experiences." When mass torts are han-
dled as class actions for purposes of judicial economy, such as in
the Dalkon Shield litigation, women are denied an opportunity
to tell their stories. Said one such Dalkon Shield victim, "I really
wish I could tell [A.H. Robins officials] face to face what they
did to me and my family. But they have such a wall around them
... legally." 30 Another woman recalls making an appointment
with the doctor who had inserted her IUD years earlier, in order
to confront him with her resulting injuries3
In products liability litigation involving medical devices, women
plaintiffs are doubly disadvantaged, because male bias in the
legal system is reinforced and compounded by male bias that
pervades the medical system. Legal scholars have pointed to
male bias within the medical research community, such as the
view that male physiology is the norm and female physiology is,
therefore, deviant.32 As a result of this unstated male norm, the
medical establishment commonly accepts research carried out
exclusively on white men as scientifically valid.33
The medical establishment has acknowledged that women are
often excluded from testing procedures, resulting in the approval
of drugs that were never tested on women.3 Consequently, doc-
tors do not know the appropriate dosages, effectiveness, or side
effects of certain drugs on women patients, in effect making the
Bias in Wrongful Death Damage Awards, 25 LAW & Soc'y REV. 263, 281-82 (1991); Steinman,
supra note 14, at 424; see Finley, supra note 15, at 49-51 (asserting that, historically, rules
limiting recovery for injury to children failed to value emotional relationships and did
not recognize that a woman's sense of identity is often closely tied up in the well-being
of her family because of her traditional role as primary caretaker).
28. See Bender, supra note 8, at 9-12.
29. Id. at 9-10.
30. PERRY & DAWSON, supra note 15, at ix.
31. Id. at 42. The opportunity for storytelling in breast implant litigation may be
particularly important, due to the strong connection between the female plaintiffs sense
of identity and self-worth and the injury to her physical appearance. See infra notes 195-
208 and accompanying text.
32. Bender, supra note 8, at 17-18; Haley Gorenberg & Amanda White, Off the Pedestal
and into the Arena: Toward Including Women in Experimental Protocols, 19 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 205, 206 (1991-1992).
33. Gorenberg & White, supra note 32, at 206.
34. Id.; Marlene Cimons, FDA to Change Drug Research Policy on Women, L.A. TiM.S,
Mar. 25, 1993. at IA; Malcolm Gladwell, Women's Health Research to be New Priority at
NIH, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1990, at A17.
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female patients "marketplace guinea pigs."35 A 1989 memorandum
from the National Institutes of Health reveals that underrepre-
sentation of women in clinical studies has caused significant gaps
in medical knowledge36 In June 1990 the General Accounting
Office reported that medical research was carried out mainly on
males, largely to the benefit of males only3
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has announced it
will reverse a policy that forbids the participation of women of
childbearing age in medical drug research 8 The policy arose in
response to a number of medical tragedies involving the use of
drugs during pregnancy, for example, birth defects caused by
thalidomide in the late 1950s. 39 Current reliable technologies are
available, however, to prevent pregnancy during drug testing. 0
Feminist scholars have identified three rationales for excluding
women from medical research. The "protectionist rationale" is
based on a presumption of risk to the woman and/or her fetus,
absent any evidence of such risk. This rationale ignores the
reproductive risks men face in drug research and the risks that
men will pass injuries along to their offspring.41 The "efficiency
rationale" is based on the notion that the male physiology is
simpler and that it is therefore easier for researchers to study
men and generalize to women. The "efficiency rationale" accepts
the belief that the white male population is the standard from
which treatments for other groups should be extrapolated.42 The
"unstated rationale" is that funding is driven by fear. This theory
suggests that the medical establishment, largely male, funds
those diseases it fears most. The lack of funding for research on
osteoporosis, breast cancer, and AIDS in women is consistent
with this claim. 43
Whereas women are often absent or underrepresented in gen-
eral medical testing, male bias has the opposite effect in the area
of contraceptive research. The scientific community places greater
emphasis on developing and marketing contraception for women
35. Gorenberg & White, supra note 32, at 222.
36. Gladwell, supra note 34, at A17.
37. Shari Roan, Working on a Cure for Unequal Medicine, L.A. TiMEs, June 9, 1992,
at 1E.
38. Cimons, supra note 34, at IA.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Gorenberg & White, supra note 32, at 209.
42. Id. at 215.
43. Id. at 216.
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than for men.44 At least one legal scholar has offered explanations
for the focus on women in this context: men have traditionally
been in the decision-making positions and would prefer to let
women take pills and injections and install foreign objects inside
their bodies.4 5 Another explanation is that, once again, the male
reproductive system is viewed as the norm and therefore need
not be altered, but the female reproductive system is seen as
deviant, and must be "fixed.."46
Products marketed for women, particularly those devices de-
signed for women's reproductive systems, such as the Dalkon
Shield, DES, Bendectin, Thalidomide, tampons, and breast im-
plants, account for the majority of mass tort litigation.47 Certain
other products, most notably asbestos and agent orange, have
caused injury predominantly to men, but the circumstances sur-
rounding the men's exposure to these products differs signifi-
cantly from the circumstances surrounding women's exposure to
defective reproductive devices. The men were exposed to asbes-
tos or agent orange as an incidence of the workplace or battle-
field. 8 The women, however, were in some sense deliberately
exposed, as the manufacturer marketed these products directly
to female consumers precisely because of their sex. 9 The dispa-
rate impact of defective products on women has led at least one
scholar to question whether manufacturers of these products are
employing a sexually discriminatory standard of care.s°
For women to recover for injuries to their reproductive sys-
tems, they frequently must detail their use of the products and
their sexual activities.51 However, the very discussion of sexual
matters tends to discredit and devalue the women's claims. 2
Furthermore, our market-referenced tort system is less likely to
fully compensate reproductive harm than injuries that occur in
the workplace or on the battlefield, because no direct economic
loss results.6
44. Steinman, supra note 14, at 412.
45. Id.
46. See Bender, supra note 8. at 16-18.
47. Steinman, supra note 14, at 409-13.
48. See id.
49. See id
50. Id.
51. Steinman, supra note 14, at 423. See generally PERRY & DAWSON, supra note 15.
52. Steinman, supra note 14, at 423.
53. Finley, upra note 9, at 22-24 (arguing that the tort system is market-referenced,
and thus undervalues harm to women's reproductive capacity).
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Both the legal and medical research systems are male biased
to the extent they have traditionally accepted the male historical
experience and body as the norm. Thus, in mass tort litigation
involving medical devices, female plaintiffs face systemic male
bias on two fronts. For the reasons discussed above, women who
use medical devices are more likely than men to be injured by
the device, but less likely to be fully compensated through the
legal system.
B. The Beauty Myth
In their book, Face Value: The Politics of BeautyY8 Robin
Tolmach Lakoff and Raquel Scherr explore a variety of myths
and countermyths about beauty. The authors comment on "the
problem of having one's self-esteem depend on a commodity ...
that is not in one's power to create, or determine, or choose, and
which will certainly disappear, through aging or changes in the
standards of the community, as time goes by."5 5 This section
outlines four underlying myths and assumptions about beauty
that have affected female tort victims' recovery by influencing
both the breast implant industry and breast implant litigation.
First, the beauty myth is a myth of happiness-it tells women
that physical perfection is the key to self-fulfillment. 8 Although
no logical connection exists between beauty and happiness, 57 a
woman who links her self-worth to her appearance does so based
not only upon her perceptions of others' reactions to her, but
also upon reality. Data from numerous studies indicate that
people are in fact treated differently from each other based upon
their appearance.58
Second, the beauty myth purports that beauty is an absolute,
intrinsically recognizable and definable. 9 Beauty, however, is
more akin to fashion .6 It changes to meet specific needs at a
54. ROBIN TOLMACH LAKOFF & RAQUEL L. SCHERR, FACE VALUE: THE POLITICS OF
BEAUTY (1984).
55. Id. at 277.
56. See id. at 126-55. But see id. at 32-33, 124 (relating conflicting myth that great
beauty brings its possessor misery).
57. Id. at 33.
58. Id. at 126-55. See generally Gerald R. Adams, Physical Attractiveness Research:
Toward a Developmental Social Psychology of Beauty, 20 HuM. DEV. 217 (1977) (compiling
about 120 psychology studies performed between 1970 and 1977 that conclude there is
indeed a link between physical attractiveness and the way people are treated).
59. TOLMACH LAKOFF & SCHERR, supra note 54, at 29.
60. Id.
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particular time and place. People in power define beauty, and as
the possession of power shifts, the definition of beauty varies
with it.61 Consequently, Wolf describes beauty as political and
asserts that it has achieved a political purpose: compensating for
the advances women have gained through the women's movement
by tying a woman's self-esteem to her physical appearance.6 2
Third, underlying the beauty myth is a close nexus between
beauty and power, or the possession of a commodity someone
else wants or needs.63 For a man, that commodity can be wealth,
influence, or knowledge, but for a woman, it has typically been
beauty." A woman's beauty, however, is of no intrinsic use to
the woman; it is valuable only because it enables her to attract
someone in possession of the commodities that will be useful or
pleasurable to her, commodities that men typically possess.65 In
effect, beauty is a currency system like the gold standard,66 and
a woman's beauty is "for" the person she attracts.67 By assigning
value to women in a vertical hierarchy according to a culturally
imposed physical attractiveness standard, beauty, Wolf argues,
is an expression of power relations in which women compete for
resources that men have appropriated for themselves.68
"Artificial" beauty, in particular, is designed for the benefit of
the onlooker.69 Eyeshadow, high heels, colored nail polish, opal-
escent lipstick, and other unnatural looks are evidence of the
effort and interest that went into a woman's appearance and
send the message that the viewer is worth the time and effort
61. Id. This argument is bolstered by notions of "artificial" beauty in other cultures,
such as bound feet, or long necks. The disfigurement that many cultures consider beautiful
appalls outsiders. Id.
62. WOLF, supra note 1, at 18-19. But see TOLMACH LAKOFF & SCHjERR, supra note 54,
at 18 (pointing out that in one sense politics is the antithesis of beauty. Politics is active-
politicians campaign, manipulate, make deals. Beauty, on the other hand, is appreciated,
adorned).
63. TOLMACH LAKOFF & SCHERR, supra note 54, at 18; see also RITA FREEDMAN, BEAUTY
BOUND 47 (1986) (asserting that although a woman may feel powerless in many ways, her
body is an arena she can try to control).
64. TOLMACH LAKOFF & SCHERR, supra note 54, at 18.
65. Id. at 19, 136-38.
66. WOLF, supra note 1, at 12.
67. See ad.; see also TOLMACH LAKOFF & SCHERR, supra note 54, at 18 (explaining that
beauty is in the eye of the beholder).
68. WOLF, supra note 1, at 12. One example of how beauty functions as power is the
stereotype of "catty," jealous women competing among each other. Another is the Greek
myth of Paris and the golden apple. A more recent example is the annual Miss America
Pageant. See TOLMACH LAKOFF & SCHERR, supra note 54, at 21-24.
69. TOLMACH LAKOFF & SCHERR, supra note 54, at 25.
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necessary to create the look: 0 The more a woman is willing to
sacrifice for the sake of someone else's pleasure, the more valu-
able the viewer feels.7' Artificial beauty is more than a statement
about the beautiful woman (the object); it is a declaration of the
importance of the viewer (the subject) 2 Indeed, beauty is one
example of how "[w]omen have served all these centuries as
looking glasses possessing the magic and delicious power of
reflecting the figure of man at twice its natural size."' 3
Finally, the beauty myth encompasses a double standard: so-
ciety puts a premium on beauty, yet considers the process of
beautification a frivolous pursuit. Tolmach Lakoff and Scherr
assert that women are often embarrassed to talk about or to
display concern with their appearance, fearing others will per-
ceive them as frivolous and, therefore, refuse to take them
seriously.74 Although beauty is the primary method women have
of attaining power and influence,6 society often dismisses beau-
tiful women, treating them as if beauty were their only attribute.
Beauty is an endless and exhausting, if not futile, process for
which women receive little credit if they succeed, but much
contempt if they do not.Y6
The visual media expose women to the beauty myth by cir-
culating millions of images of the current ideal. The message,
delivered daily by the myriad images of beauty, is that women
must look a certain way to be loved and admired-to be worth
anything.77 Images of the ideal female body have become taller
and thinner while the majority of young American women has
become heavier. 8 For example, one study has concluded that
women as thin as the average modern mannequin would most
likely be too thin to menstruate.7 9
Numerous scholars and studies have recognized a link between
physical attractiveness and the way people are treated °80 For
70. Id. at 25-26; FREEDMAN, supra note 63, at 51.
71. See WOLF, supra note 1, at 12.
72. TOLMACH LAKOFF & SCHERR, supra note 54, at 282.
73. VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OwN 53 (1929),
74. TOLMACH LAKOFF & SCHERR, supra note 54, at 13-17; see FREEDMAN, supra note
63, at 54-55; see also WOLF, supra note 1, at 9, 61-62, 70-71.
75. TOLMACH LAKOFF & SCHERR, supra note 54, at 154.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 114.
78. The New American Body, U. CAL. BERKELEY WELLNESS LETTER (Health Letter
Assocs.), Dec. 1993, at 1.
79. Id.
80. See Adams, supra note 58, at 223-26.
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women in particular, beauty is often of foremost concern.81 Yet,
in beauty, as in other aspects of life, the personal is political.
Beauty, writes Wolf, is determined by politics. It is a belief
system that preserves male dominance 2 This belief system,
bolstered by the mass media, aids the marketing and sale of
women's beauty products such as breast implants8s Thus, a
feminist analysis of products liability requires a recognition that
our patriarchal system itself promotes beauty devices such as
breast implants, while systemic male bias within medicine and
law adversely affects the products' safety and impedes the re-
covery of subsequent women plaintiffs.
II. THE IMPLANT INDUSTRY
Silicone breast implants and the resulting litigation are an
excellent example of the interplay between the male biases in
the medical and legal institutions and the beauty myth. Initially,
manufacturers of silicone breast implants enjoyed enormous suc-
cess from their products. The story of the marketing, testing,
and sale of implants, however, reflects the general patterns of
male bias present within the medical system as a whole.8 Fur-
thermore, the beauty myth has worked to the benefit of the
implant industry and neither manufacturers nor surgeons have
hesitated to allow the myth to bolster their sales. Part A of this
section recounts the story of the breast implant controversy and
Part B demonstrates how various myths and assumptions about
beauty have benefited the implant industry.
A. The Breast Implant Story
Until media attention and the legal system exposed the poten-
tial dangers of silicone breast implants, implant surgery was one
of the most popular cosmetic surgery procedures performed in
the United States.5 The FDA estimates that one million women
81. See WOLF, supra note 1, at 17 (pointing to the United States' $20 billion cosmetics
industry); see also Reena N. Glazer, Women's Body Image and the Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 113,
137 (1993) (reporting that the breast implant industry has grown into a $500 million a
year business).
82. WOLF, supra note 1, at 12.
83. See discussion infra part II.B.
84. See supra notes 32-53 and accompanying text.
85. Sarah Glazer, Women's Health, Battle Over Breast Implants, Fewer Women are
Seeking Enlargements, Plastic Surgeons Say, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1992, at Z7.
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in the United States have undergone breast implant surgery,8
but other estimates place the number as high as two million.8
According to the FDA, breast implant surgery for augmentation
purposes accounts for eighty percent of the implant industry.
Breast cancer patients seeking post-mastectomy 88 reconstruction
account for the remaining twenty percent8 9
In 1992 the FDA received 21,968 complaints relating to breast
implants. ° As of December 1, 1993, the agency had received an
additional 19,144 complaintsY1 Package inserts included with man-
ufacturer Dow Corning's implants acknowledge "reports of sus-
pected immunological responses to silicone mammary implants." 2
The information also lists the following side effects: difficulty in
cancer detection, skin breakdown, pain, asymmetry, decreased
breast sensation, gel bleed (seepage of silicone through the im-
plant shell), and migration of implants 3 Another complication
associated with breast implants is "capsular contracture," a con-
dition in which the breasts become as "hard and round as base-
balls."94 Capsular contracture requires either further surgery to
remove the scar tissue or a procedure called a "closed capsulo-
tomy" in which the surgeon breaks up the scar tissue by leaning
heavily on the woman's breasts s Surgeons disagree as to the
rate of occurrence of capsular contracture, but estimates run as
high as seventy-five percent.9
Silicone implants have generated enormous amounts of litiga-
tion. In the United States, an estimated 12,000 lawsuits are
86. Id.
87. Teich v. FDA, 751 F. Supp. 243 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Tim Smart, What Did the Industry
Know, and When?, Bus. WK., June 10, 1991, at 94.
88. Mastectomy is the excision of the breast. ILLUSTRATED STEADMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 837 (24th ed. 1982).
89. Glazer, supra note 85.
90. Christopher Connell, AMA Urges No Ban on Silicone Gel Implants, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Dec. 1, 1993, at 5A.
91. Id.
92. Dan C. Bolton, The Evolution of Breast Implant Litigation, in LITIGATING BREAST
IMPLANT CASES: A SATELLITE PROGRAM 127, 162 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. H-451, 1992).
93. Id. at 158-62; see also Judy Foreman, Before You Opt for a Breast Implant
BOSTON GLOBE, July 22, 1991, at 37 (discussing patients who ended up with implants in
their abdomens or armpits).
94. Foreman, supra note 93, at 37.
95. Id.
96. Id. (interview with rheumatologist at the University -of South Florida); see also
WOLF, supra note 1, at 324-25 n.237 (70% rate of capsular contraction); Foreman, supra
note 9S (25-40% for smooth surface implants, 4% for coated surface implants).
BREAST IMPLANT LITIGATION
currently pending against implant manufacturers. 97 Some women
are claiming immunological injuries associated with implants,
such as lupus, connective tissue disorder, and chronic fatigue.9 8
Others allege the devices cause mental confusion," depression, 100
suicidal ideation, 10 1 and reasonable fear of future damages.0 2 At
least one claim alleges defective implants caused a death.10 ' In
Fueuer v. McGahn Medical Corp.,104 seven children sued various
manufacturers of silicone implants and requested a medical mon-
itoring fund for all children born to and/or breast fed by women
with implants. 0 5 The plaintiffs alleged that silicone tainted their
mothers' breast milk, causing them to suffer physical injuries
such as gastrointestinal problems, autoimmune symptoms, con-
nective tissue disorder, and elevated liver enzymes.'06
Silicone implants were marketed in the United States for
nearly twenty years without FDA approval.'07 When the devices
first were put on the market, FDA approval was not required,
as the agency had no jurisdiction over medical devices until the
mid-1970s. 08 At that time, products currently on the market were
97. Breast Implants: Three Major Producers to Pay $3 Billion Toward $4.75 Billion
Global Settlement Fund, Prod. Liab. Daily (BNA), Feb. 24, 1994, available in Westlaw,
BNA-PLD database [hereinafter Three Major Producers].
98. Bolton, supra note 92, at 165.
99. Breast Implants: Class Action Filed in Ohio Court Seeking Damages for Past, Future
Injuries, Prod. Liab. Daily (BNA), Feb. 19, 1992, available in Westlaw, BNA-PLD database
(discussing Dante v. Dow Corning Corp.).
100. Breast Implants: Three Georgia Women Sue Manufacturers, Alleging Devices Caused
Various Ailments, Prod. Liab. Daily (BNA). Jan. 29, 1992, available in Westlaw, BNA-
PLD database (discussing Martin v. Dow Corning Corp.) [hereinafter Three Georgia
Women].
101. Breast Implants: Suit Filed in Federal Court in Tennessee Alleges Devices Lead to
'Suicidal Ideation,' Prod. Liab. Daily (BNA), Feb. 19, 1992, available in Westlaw, BNA-
PLD database (discussing Pool v. Surgitek, Inc.).
102. Breast Implants: Woman Files Suit Seeking Damages for Fear of Future Injury,
Prod. Liab. Daily (BNA), Feb. 5. 1992, available in Westlaw, BNA-PLD database (discussing
Moe v. Dow Corning Wright).
103. Breast Implants: Widower Sues Dow Coming, Physician, Alleging Devices Caused
Wife's Death, Prod. Liab. Daily (BNA), Apr. 22, 1992, available in Westlaw, BNA-PLD
database.
104. Breast Implants: Children of Nursing Mothers Sue Makers, Seek Monitoring for
Silicone Related Harm, Prod. Liab. Daily BNAL Mar. 4, 1993, available in Westlaw, BNA-
PLD database (discussing Feuer v. McGhan Medical Corp.).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Michael Castleman, The Enemy Within, 13 CAL. LAW. 44, 47 (Mar. 1993); Smart,
supra note 87.
108. Breast implants are governed by the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 21
U.S.C. S 360(c) (1988).
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"grandfathered" in, pending later review by an advisory panel.10 9
In 1982, amid growing concerns about gel migration and un-
known long-term toxic effects of silicone, the FDA proposed a
classification for silicone implants that would require manufac-
turers to prove their safety."0 The proposal did not become law,
however, until April 1991."' By that time, the FDA had received
some five thousand complaints about silicone implants. 12
One reason for the FDA's delay in requiring proof of breast
implant safety may be that cosmetic surgeons dominated the
advisory panel.113 As a profession, cosmetic surgeons faced sub-
stantial economic losses if the FDA banned breast implants.
According to the American Society for Plastic and Reconstructive
Surgeons (ASPRS), breast augmentation was one of the top three
cosmetic surgery procedures in 1990.11 Breast augmentation ac-
counted for fourteen percent"5 of procedures in the $300 million
per year industry."6 Such an apparent conflict of interest calls
into question the motives of the FDA advisory panel.
Once aware of the risk implants pose, women have had diffi-
culty getting them removed. A breast implant operation takes
twenty minutes to two hours, but surgical removal can take three
to six hours, especially if the implant's coating has disintegrated
or the implant has ruptured."17 One specialist described the proc-
ess of removing the silicone that escapes after an implant rup-
tures as being "like picking wet bread from a basin of water.""8
Surgeons are often reluctant or unwilling to perform the opera-
tion,"9 and insurance companies often refuse to pay for it.120
109. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 102D CONG., 2D SESS., FDA's
REGULATION OF SILICONE BREAST IMPLANTS 4 (Comm. Print 1992); Castleman, supra note
107, at 47.
110. Smart, supra note 87, at 94.
111. 21 C.F.R. S 878.3540(c) (1994).
112. Teresa Moran Schwartz, Punitive Damages and Regulated Products, 42 AM. U. L.
REV. 1335 (1993); see also Stuart A. Schlesinger, Breast Implants and the Law, N.Y..L.J.,
Jan. 1992, at col. 1 (asserting that the number of lawsuits against implant manufacturers
should have alerted the FDA years before they took action of the possibility that Dow's
claims of safety were unsupported. "The silicone breast implant controversy supports
the position that having the FDA approve a drug or product may be proof of nothing:').
113. Smart, supra note 87, at 94.
114. Glazer, supra note 85, at Z.
115. Id.
116. WOLF, supra note 1. at 17. The cosmetic surgery industry is the fastest growing
medical specialty. Id. at 10.
117. Foreman, supra note 93, at 37.
118. Id.
119. Emily C. Aschinger, The Selling of the Perfect Breast: Silicone, Surgeons, and Strict
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Procrastination by the FDA and uncooperativeness on the part
of surgeons and insurance companies are not the only factors
that led to the breast implant controversy. Perhaps one of the
greatest causes of the uproar was the revelation that manufac-
turers were aware of dangers years before the FDA took any
action. 121 For at least a decade prior to an FDA study linking
implants to a cancer-causing agent, manufacturers knew of animal
studies that linked implants to cancer and other illnesses. 122
Internal company memos reveal that researchers at Dow Corning
questioned the safety of silicone implants as early as the 1970s.123
By 1974 Dow had warnings on file from researchers reporting
possible side effects as well as complaints from recipients with
medical problems.1 24 In November 1992 Dow Corning admitted
that some of its employees had altered data from tests of silicone
gel implants.12 If indeed "[b]eauty is truth, truth beauty,"'18 then
perhaps it is no surprise that Dow Corning's deception led to
the disfigurement of so many women.
If Dow's own test results and researchers' warnings did not
alert Dow to the possibility that breast implants were unsafe,
the litigation should have. As early as 1981, Dow defended a
lawsuit in which the plaintiff alleged that silicone breast implants
caused injury when they ruptured.'2 Dow did not contest that
the rupture caused the plaintiff's injury.12 Rather, Dow argued
Liability, 61 UMKC L. REv. 399, 413 (1992) (proposing that plastic surgeons be classified
as "sellers" of breast implants and be subject to strict liability for implanting defective
products).
120. Sandra G. Boodman, Breast Implants: Now Women are Having a Hard Time Getting
Them Out, WASH. POST, June 23, 1992, at Z10, 27; Barbara A. Serrano, Women Seek Help
for Implant Removak Insurance Often Won't Pay, Legislators Told, SEATTLE Ti ES, Apr.
21, 1992, at D1.
121. Schlesinger, supra note 112, at col. 1; see also Teich v.'FDA, 751 F. Supp. 243
(D.C. Cir. 1990).
122. Smart, supra note 87, at 94.
123. Bolton, supra note 92, at 187-93; Chronology Silicone Breast Implants, STAR TRIB.,
Oct. 17, 1993, at 15A.
124. Michele Weldon, Her-Say: Score One for Legal Scare Tactics, CHI. THIB., July 4,
1993, at 9C.
125. Castleman, supra note 107, at 106.
126. John Keats, Ode on a Grecian Urn, line 49.
127. Klein v. Dow Corning Corp., 661 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that the statute
of limitations did not start to run on plaintiff's claim until the implants ruptured); see
also Breast Implants: Minneapolis Woman Files Class Action Suit Seeking Damages for
Fear of Future Injury, Prod. Liab. Daily (BNA), Feb. 5, 1992, available in Westlaw, BNA-
PLD database (discussing Moe v. Dow Corning Wright) (alleging Dow Corning knew as
early as 1975 that implants were only minimally tested and that silicone gel could escape).
128. Klein, 661 F.2d at 998.
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that the tort claims were barred by the statute of limitations. In
holding that the plaintiff's cause of action accrued from the time
of implant rupture, not of implantation, the court compared a
ruptured implant injury to the damage caused by a "toxic
chemical" 12 9 in Thornton v. Roosevelt Hospital.130 "U.I]n Thornton,
injection and injury were concurrent. The chemical began its
damage immediately. Here damage occurred only when the pros-
theses burst."''1 1 The willingness of the court to compare silicone
to a "toxic chemical" should have put Dow on notice of the
likelihood of other breast implant claims.
Three years earlier, in 1978, another breast implant manufac-
turer had faced similar litigation. The litigant claimed that sili-
cone adversely affected the body after escaping from implants. 13 2
In V. Mueller & Co. v. Corley, 33 the plaintiff received breast
implants after undergoing a mastectomy.34 When the plaintiffs
incision failed to heal properly, her doctor removed the implants
and observed a tear in the implant "shell."' 35 The doctor detected
the presence of silastic fluid in the plaintiffs wound, and blamed
this for the failure of the wound to heal properly.13
Dow could have responded to these early cases by conducting
more safety studies or notifying consumers of reported injuries.
Instead, Dow attempted to conceal its prior knowledge of safety
concerns. In Teich v. FDA,""7 both Dow and the FDA contended
that animal studies constituted 'confidential' commercial infor-
mation" under exemption four of the Freedom of Information
Act.13 8 Holding that "[t]his is the very type of case for which the
Freedom of Information Act was designed,"' 39 the court chastised
Dow for creating "unnecessary roadblocks" and preventing in-
formed decisions. 40
Dow's stonewalling has led to at least two claims based on this
conduct alone. In Los Angeles Dow is the subject of a criminal
129. Id. at 999.
130. 391 N.E.2d 1002 (N.Y. 1979).
131. Klein, 661 F.2d at 999.
132. V. Mueller & Co. v. Corley, 570 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 141.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 732 F. Supp. 17 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
138. Id. at 17.
139. Id. at 20.
140. Id. Many aspects of the testing and early litigation of breast implants parallel
those of the Dalkon Shield. For an excellent account of the Dalkon Shield story, see
MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST (1985).
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investigation under the California Corporate Criminal Liability
Act."' The law provides for criminal sanctions against corporate
managers who possess actual knowledge of a product's serious
concealed danger, but fail to notify government safety agencies. 42
A second claim alleges conspiracy among several manufacturers
to mislead the medical profession and the public about implant
safety.'43
In January 1992, after ordering Dow to turn over its research
documents, the FDA imposed a moratorium on the sale of silicone
implants. In April 1992 the agency allowed the use of silicone
implants for reconstructive surgery as part of a clinical study.'44
The FDA has also insisted it must be able to notify current
implant users quickly if new problems arise.145 Implant manufac-
turers contend that this type of record keeping will increase the
cost of business. 146 Indeed, Keith McKennon, corporate chair of
Dow Corning, has announced that the company, whose market
share represented ten to fifteen percent of the silicone gel implant
market prior to the moratorium, will not re-enter the market if
the FDA moratorium is lifted.147
The FDA is not alone in its reaction to breast implant litigation;
courts and manufacturers have also responded. In June 1992 the
federal courts consolidated all federal breast implant cases to the
Northern District of Alabama under Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr.148
In addition, Dow proposed a $4.25 billion class action settlement
to cover worldwide claims which was approved by Judge Pointer
on September 1, 1994.149 In February 1994 Dow Corning agreed
141. CAL. PENAL CODE S 387 (West 1993); Breast Implants: Los Angeles Investigates Dow
Coming Under California Criminal Liability Law, Prod. Liab. Daily (BNA), Feb. 19, 1992,
available in Westlaw, BNA-PLD database.
142. Id.
143. Breast Implants: Seven Tennessee Plaintiffs Sue Dow Coming Alleging Conspiracy
to Conceal Risks, Prod. Liab. Daily (BNA), Sept. 24, 1992, available in Westlaw, BNA-
PLD database (discussing Rachel v. Dow Corning Corp.).
144. John Schwartz, Breast Implant Settlement Enters Notification Period, WASH. POST,
Apr. 5, 1994, at AS.
145. James M. Gomez, Makers Must Track All Implants, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1993, at
ID.
146. Id.
147. Product Safety: Dow Coming Announces Withdrawal from Silicone Gel Breast
Implant Market, Prod. Liab. Daily (BNA), Mar. 20, 1992, available in Westlaw, BNA-PLD
database [hereinafter Withdrawal]. Dow has maintained that the decision is not an
admission that silicone implants are unsafe. Id.
148. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L.
1992).
149. Three Major Producers, supra note 97; $4.2 Billion Implant Settlement Is Approved,
N.Y. TrMES, Sept. 2, 1994, at A20 [hereinafter Settlement Is Approved].
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to pay $2 billion to the settlement fund.1e Bristol-Myers Squibb
Company and Baxter Healthcare Corporation provided more than
$1 billion.16 1 This is the largest personal injury settlement in
history.5 2 Plaintiffs' steering committee co-chair Stanley Chesley
estimates the class could be as large as 1.4 million women. 15
More than 90,500 women have already filed claims.'14
One of the most advantageous features of the settlement is
that it opens up a thirty year recovery opportunity for women
whose diseases develop or worsen after the statute of limitations
has run. 55 Furthermore, under the settlement, women who suffer
from one of the specified conditions will receive payments of
$200,000 to $2 million without proving the implants caused the
injury.'5 In addition, most of the women who have filed individual
claims cannot identify which of the 1500 kinds of implants they
received; the settlement will permit recovery in this situation.'6
The settlement will also compensate plaintiffs in significantly less
time than would conventional litigation.M
Critics of the settlement argue that it will not adequately
compensate those plaintiffs with severe injuries.6 9 Mike Hugo, a
member of the settlement advisory committee, estimates the
fund will accommodate only about 3000 women, although an
estimated 12,000 cases are currently pending nationwide. 60 If the
$4.25 billion is insufficient to compensate all claimants, plaintiffs
may receive smaller payments than their claims warrant.'6' Hugo
argues that if manufacturers and suppliers want to conceal doc-
uments, "they should be willing to fund a settlement of at least
$10 billion."'1 2 Another critic argues that the settlement unfairly
limits recovery of women outside the United States.16c Claims by
nonresidents are restricted to three percent of the amount United
150. Schwartz, supra note 144, at A3.
151. Id.
152. Settlement Is Approved, supra note 149, at A20.
153. Three Major Producers, supra note 97.
154. Settlement Is Approved, supra note 149, at A20.
155. Three Major Producers, supra note 97.
156. Id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Settlement Is Approved, supra note 149, at A20.
162. Three Major Producers, supra note 97.
163. Id. (interviewing Mark Steven of the law firm Connell, Lightbody in Vancouver,
Canada).
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States citizens receive. 16 The approved settlement sets aside
$96.6 million for women outside the United States.18 5
Dow has also announced it intends to create a $10 million
research fund, and pay up to $1200 to women who will need
implants removed, or have had implants removed, for "medical
reasons.1 66 The woman and her doctor will determine what
constitutes medical need.16 7 Critics argue that the $1200 would
cover only reimbursement for the device itself, as surgical fees
can reach several thousand dollars. 16
B. How the Beauty Myth Benefits Industry
The breast implant and cosmetic surgery industries have al-
lowed the myths and underlying assumptions about beauty to
sell their products and services. Amid conflicting, frequently
deprecating messages women receive from society, one message
is clear-women are supposed to be sexy, which translates into
breasty16 9 Boston health advocate Esther Rome calls breast aug-
mentation "a medical solution to a social problem. A lot of women
grow up with a poor body image in this culture, but nobody can
be the ideal because it's so narrow."'170 These myths and assump-
tions about beauty have helped manufacturers to sell breast
implants, and have helped surgeons to sell augmentation surgery,
by shaping a woman's assessment of the product's utility. Thus,
these myths and assumptions must be considered in breast im-
plant litigation.
Dow capitalizes on the beauty myth in its informational patient
brochure: "If you are thinking about having breast implants, then
join the hundreds of thousands of modern women who already
have them. And hundreds of thousands more who will soon. Of
course, you can look the way you wish. And be a totally happier
woman."'171 In this brochure, Dow appeals directly to the female
consumer's desire to attain happiness through beauty.
164. Id.
165. Settlement Is Approved, supra note 149, at A20.
166. Withdrawal, supra. note 147.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Jan Gehorsam, Women Feeling Pressured to Sculpt a Perfect Body, Implants a,
Response to Cultural Message, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 29, 1992, at Al (interviewing
Georgia State University sociologist Jackie Boles).
170. Foreman, supra note 93, at 37.
171. Bolton, supra note 92, at 149.
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In separate information provided only to doctors, however,
Dow warns against using implants for a patient who
"[d]emonstrates psychological instability ... or inappropriate mo-
tivation or attitude."'72 The information does not indicate what
might be an "inappropriate motivation" for implant surgery.
Dow's patient brochure, however, implies that the piursuit of
happiness, as opposed to beauty, is not an inappropriate motive
for wanting larger breasts. Thus, Dow's sales literature implicitly
relies upon the myth that beauty brings its possessor happiness.173
Manufacturers relied upon the changing nature of beauty and
its political function 174 to sell breast implants. The popularity of
breast size has changed with fashion. The '20s, '40s, and '60s
celebrated boyish figures, reflecting growing opportunities for
women as they entered the male arena of work. 7 6 In the '80s,
big breasts came back into style, possibly due to media images
which sold sex more than ever before. Newspapers, magazines,
cable, and video all constantly displayed images of cleavage, much
of it artificially enhanced. 76
As the woman-targeted media portrayed women with bigger
and bigger breasts, the standard of the normal body image
changed.177 According to one survey, the number of American
women dissatisfied with their breast size rose from one-quarter
in 1973 to one-third in 1986.17 8 Although the number of men
surveyed who were dissatisfied with their own chest size also
rose over this same period,7 9 it was the women, not the men,
whom implant manufacturers targeted as consumers. Thus, for
women, "fixing the problem" with breast implants became so
simple that many felt they were losing out on an opportunity if
they declined to do it.I80
172. Id. at 155.
173. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
174. See supre notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
175. Gehorsam, supra note 169, at Al. Katherine Hepburn and Marlene Dietrich are
examples of this changing beauty fashion. Jd.
176. Id. Perhaps big breasts regained popularity in the '80s as a reaction to too many
women entering male dominated jobs. Big breasts emphasize one of the physical differ-
ences between men and women, and women who do not have boyish figures do not fit
in with the boys.
177. Linda R. Hirshman, Reply: Big Breasts and Bengali Beggars: A Reply to Richard
Posner and Martha Nussbaum 70 TEx. L. REv. 1029, 1032 (1992).
178. Thomas F. Cash et al., The Great American Shape Up, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Apr. 1986,
at 30, 33.
179. Id. The number of dissatisfied men increased from 18% in 1973 to 28% in 1986.
Id
180. Gehorsam, supra note 169, at Al.
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The changing nature and political function of beauty has helped
plastic surgeons sell breast augmentation surgery. In the early
'80s, the American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons
(ASPRS) coined a new disease called micromastia, or "small
breasts."''1 Petitioning the FDA that this was a bona fide medical
problem, surgeons claimed that breast implants were often nec-
essary to fix what they termed a "deformity."18 2 At least one
critic has charged that "micromastia" is nothing more than a "PR
blitzkrieg" designed to bolster demand for ASPRS' services.'83
Although the "ideal" breast size, like other aspects of fashion,
has changed over time in the United States,184 the ASPRS has
used medical terminology to reinforce one particular trend. This
is a classic example of how those with power reinforce the power
structure through naming and labeling.'8
Another writer has argued that such conduct on the part of
plastic surgeons, in addition to their active participation in ad-
vertising and selling the devices, justifies classifying plastic sur-
geons as "sellers" of breast implants.188 This classification would
eliminate the immunity from strict liability in tort that plastic
surgeons, as providers of a service, currently enjoy.'8
Just as beauty is in the eye of the beholder, often the primary
value of breast augmentation is the sexual admiration of others.' 88
Although manufacturers claim silicone gel "feels natural,"',* breast
implants frequently cause reduced sensation in the breasts.90
When this complication occurs, it is unlikely the patient considers
her breasts to "feel natural." Moreover, up to seventy-five per-
cent of women with implants experience capsular contracture,
which gives their breasts the consistency of hard plastic. 9' Iron-
181. Id.; Aschinger, supra note 119, at 407. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S MEDICAL DESK Dic-
TIONARY 436 (1993) defines micromastia as "postpubertal immaturity and abnormal small-
ness of the breasts."
182. Aschinger, supra note 119, at 407; Gehorsam, supra note 169.
183. SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN 217
(1991).
184. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
185. See Bender, supra note 8, at 16-25; Martha Minow, Forward: Justice Engendered,
101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 61 (1987).
186. Aschinger, supra note 119, at 406-15.
187. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A (1965); Margine v. Krasnica, 227 A.2d
539 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1967).
188. Hirshman, supra note 177, at 1033.
189. WOLF, supra note 1, at 248 (describing an advertisement in a surgical journal
which shows a man squeezing a silicone gel implant, remarking that it "feels natural").
190. Hirshman, supra note 177, at 1033; Bolton, supra note 92, at 158-59, 162.
191. WOLF, supra note 1, at 248; see supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
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ically, capsular contracture, a purely unintended complication, is
merely one step closer (or perhaps one step too far) towards the
complete objectification of a woman's body; a transformation into
the barbie-doll-like ideal figure, which can be admired and touched,
but which has no sensation itself.
III. THE BEAUTY MYTH AND COMPENSATION OF BREAST
IMPLANT PLAINTIFFS
Breast implant users are likely to underestimate the risks
posed by the product for two reasons: (1) industry misconduct
ranging from inadequate testing to outright deception in test
results,192 and (2) the lack of adequate warnings provided to the
user.193 Furthermore, the beauty myth may influence the user's
expectations about beauty products, and thus color her appreci-
ation of their benefits and utility. Because such factors as risk,
benefit, and utility are central to a products liability analysis,
the beauty myth's influence necessarily has legal consequences
in breast implant litigation.
The beauty myth may hinder a breast implant user's recov-
ery by encompassing a double standard. Beauty is promoted as
essential to self-worth, and at the same time, characterized as a
frivolous pursuit.194 Such characterizations of a woman's actions
further hinder her tort recovery by inviting inappropriate con-
siderations of her conduct. Such considerations may include in-
quiries into her reasons for choosing the product (for
reconstruction or augmentation) and her lifestyle. The following
section illustrates how the beauty myth affects silicone breast
implant litigation on several levels.
Livshits v. Natural Y Surgical Specialties95 demonstrates how
the beauty myth affects an implant user's expectations about
breast implants and informs her view of the injuries caused by
the implants. In Livshits, plaintiff alleged defendant's polyure-
thane foam-covered silicone gel implants accelerated- the devel-
opment of breast cancer in her right breast, ultimately forcing
her to undergo a mastectomy rather than a lumpectomy. 96 Plain-
192. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
193. Under the learned intermediary doctrine, breast implant manufacturers are re-
quired to warn the surgeon, rather than the patients, of known risks. See discussion infra
part IV.
194. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
195. 35 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
196. Id. at *5.
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tiff further alleged that the polyurethane foam degraded into a
toxic byproduct that caused her to develop cancer in her ovaries
and uterus. 197 In addition, plaintiff alleged the silicone and foam
residue in her remaining breast made it impossible to monitor
for cancer and therefore a mastectomy for this breast was also
likely.198
Plaintiff testified that since early adolescence she had been
"acutely concerned" about the appearance of her breasts, and
that this concern led her to decide to undergo breast augmen-
tation surgery.'" In the weeks immediately following surgery,
plaintiff experienced an infection.w Surgeons removed the im-
plants, but the implants ruptured during the procedure, leaving
remnants of polyurethane foam and silicone in plaintiffs breast
tissue.201 Plaintiff stated that when she was later diagnosed with
breast cancer, the importance of her physical appearance led her
to reject a mastectomy and instead undergo a lumpectomy.20 2 She
experienced continued excruciating pain and observed green liq-
uid seeping from her breasts.203 Doctors believed that these
symptoms were linked to the presence of silicone and polyure-
thane residue in her breast tissue, which necessitated a mastec-
tomy.2
The beauty myth influenced the plaintiffs decision to undergo
breast implant surgery in the first place, and it persuaded her
to choose a lumpectomy rather than a mastectomy when she
developed breast cancer. In addition, the beauty myth affected
her own conceptualization of her injury. She testified, "I don't
feel like a woman at all. I feel-I can't look at a mirror of myself,
I try not to think about it, I have scars all over, one breast. I
have nothing else, I don't know who I am. 20 5
The court held that the expert who testified as to the link
between the implants and the acceleration of plaintiffs cancer
was not qualifiedVH The court therefore set aside a jury verdict
for plaintiff of $2.5 million for pain and suffering, and $450,000
197. Id. at *5-*6.
198. Id. at *6.
199. Id. at *26-*27.
200. Id. at *2-*3.
201. Id. at *3.
202. Id. at *27.
203. Id. at *5.
204. Id.
205. Id. at *27.
206. 1d. at *23-*24.
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for lost wages, but affirmed an award of $1.5 million for future
damages.20 7 In order to compensate plaintiff as fairly as possible,
however, the court should have considered her injury in its
proper context.
Plaintiff's injury occurred in a society that privileges female
beauty, in which one's physical attractiveness influences how one
is treated and in which a woman's self-esteem is often caught up
in her appearance. 20 0 These factors all promote a favorable market
atmosphere for the implant industry. To the extent these societal
factors aid the manufacturers' sales, courts should consider them
when compensating the resulting injuries. Courts should hold
manufacturers to a standard of care that recognizes that the
same assumptions about beauty that create a demand for implants
also inform plaintiffs' perception of their injuries.
In a products liability action, the double standard of the beauty
myth2 9 can lead to inappropriate considerations of the plaintiffs
conduct. A good example of such a case is Turner v. Dow Corning
Corp.210 Turner McCartney (McCartney) was a former topless
dancer who had augmentation surgery in 1987 and has since
undergone six operations to correct problems from implant rup-
ture. 1 McCartney lost a $7 million lawsuit that alleged that the
ruptured implants caused immune dysfunction, chronic fatigue,
joint and muscle pain, and short term memory loss. The verdict
against McCartney, which came after only one hour of delibera-
tion,2 2 was the first victory for Dow since the FDA moratorium
in January 199213
Lawyers for Dow focused on McCartney's lifestyle, which in-
fluenced at least two of the six jurors.214 In a post-trial interview,
one juror said, "[Plaintiff] gave her baby up for adoption, she
had abortions, she was a dancer for seven years, and all at once
she wanted (damages for alleged faulty) breast implants."21 5 An-
207. Id. at *33.
208. See discussion supra part II.B.
209. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
210. Jennifer Mears, Dancer Loses Implant Lawsuit: Dow Coming Says Damage Un-
proven, DETROIT FREE PREss, June 12, 1993, at 6A; Breast Implants: Colorado Jury Returns
Defense Verdict in Lawsuit by Former Topless Dancer, Prod. Liab. Daily (BNA), June 29,
1993, available in Westlaw, BNA-PLD database (discussing Turner v. Dow Corning Corp.)
[hereinafter Colorado Jury].
211. Colorado Jury, supra note 210.
212. Id.
213. Mears, supra note 210, at 6A.
214. Id.
215. Colorado Jury, supra note 210 (quoting a videotaped interview recorded by Dow
BREAST IMPLANT LITIGATION
other juror, however, said that the plaintiff simply failed to link
her immune system injuries to the breast implants. 216 Ironically,
a few days after the verdict, a University of Wisconsin Hospital
study revealed that women with silicone implants showed signs
of abnormal immune system reactions similar to those McCartney
alleged.217
Plaintiffs attorney, Jo Stone, has suggested that Dow took
this case to trial as a part of an overall strategy to dissuade
women from coming forward in the future.218 In addition, Stone
claims Dow hired private investigators to look into plaintiff's
past, and the past of her associates.2 9 Stone also alleges that one
defense expert was paid $1 million to testify.220
Regardless of whether Dow's alleged trial strategies influenced
the jury, the jurors' statements make it clear that the beauty
myth affected the outcome of the trial. If a breast implant is
defective, it is defective even if the plaintiff has given up her
baby for adoption, had abortions, or worked as a dancer. These
lifestyle choices are irrelevant to the plaintiffs claim. Perhaps
the evidence somehow seems less objectionable if the plaintiff
claims her alleged injuries resulted from another lifestyle choice
on her part-the choice to surgically enlarge her breasts. More-
over, if this choice is considered "frivolous," the jury may be
more likely to dismiss the plaintiffs injuries as just another
consequence of her "bad" lifestyle.
Breast augmentation is not merely seen as frivolous, but as an
unreasonable, even stupid decision. The injuries from the im-
plants prove the stupidity. Anyone who would have their healthy
breasts sliced open and sacs of silicone gel shoved in, merely to
look more beautiful, must be stupid. 1 Furthermore, this line of
thinking is borne out by recurrent stereotypes linking beauty
with stupidity, the classic example being the dumb blond.22
after the trial. Another juror called the lawsuit a scam. "we thought not only that, we
think most (breast implant cases) are going to be scams" (alteration in original)) (second
alteration in original).
216. Id.
217. Mears, supra note 210, at 6A.
218. Colorado Jury, supra note 210. Attorneys for Dow, however, denied having such
a legal strategy. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See FREEDMAN, supra note 63, at 54-55 (setting forth the idea that beautification
rituals have been used as proof that women are inferior and stupid).
222. TOLMACH LAKOFF & SCHERR, supra note 54, at 35.
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The myth that beauty brings its possessor miserym also prej-
udices the plaintiff. Disfigurement, illnesses, and injuries are part
of the price of beauty. No one ever said being beautiful was
easy. Furthermore, women's injuries from implants are seen as
punishment for deception. The women were trying to "get away"
with something, tricking men into believing they were more
beautiful, and thus more valuable, than they actually were. 24
Lucinda Finley and others have asserted that the legal and
medical systems have often marginalized women's injuries by
calling them hysterical, rather than physical.22 Now implant
manufacturers are utilizing this tactic. In Johnson v. Bristol-Myers
SquibbP the plaintiff suffered a variety of flu-like symptoms,
including fatigue, joint pain, chronic infections, and headaches,
for two years following the rupture of her left implant during a
closed capsulotomy.227 Defense attorneys unsuccessfully main-
tained that Johnson was a victim of mass media hysteria, not
defective implants.2 The manufacturer was more successful in
Turner v. Dow Coming Corp.m An attorney for Dow Corning
called the victory against McCartney precedent setting because
it was based on science, not hysteria.230
The medical community has responded similarly to implant
injuries. In Martin v. Dow Coming Corp.,231 the plaintiff also
experienced flu-like symptoms, in addition to panic attacks, in-
somnia, forgetfulness, and confusion. Doctors diagnosed Martin
with depression and prescribed an anti-depressant. Later, Martin
was hospitalized for two weeks and treated with Prozac, another
anti-depressant, for fourteen months. Doctors later discovered
that her implants had ruptured.
In addition to diagnosing women's implant-related injuries as
hysterical, doctors have maintained that women with small breasts
will suffer emotional harm without implants. The ASPRS has
stated that flat chestedness causes a "total lack of well-being. '9s2
223. Id. at 32-33.
224. See FREEDMAN, supra note 63, at 54-55.
225. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
226. Breast Irmplants: Texas Jury Awards $25 Million to Woman Who Alleged Devices
Caused Silicone Disease, Prod. Liab. Daily (BNA), Jan. 12, 1993, available in Westlaw,
BNA-PLD database (discussing Johnson v. Bristol-Myers Squibb).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Colorado Jury, supra note 210.
230. Mears, supra note 210. at 6A.
231. Three Georgia Women, supra note 100 (discussing Martin v. Dow Corning Corp.).
232. FALUDl supra note 183, at 217; see supra notes 181-87 and accompanying text.
BREAST IMPLANT LITIGATION
Once again, the beauty myth poses a no-win situation for implant
users-without augmentation surgery, women with small breasts
will lack emotional well-being, but women who allege implant
injuries are called victims of mass media hysteria.
When women choose to have their implants removed, often
their surgeons are reluctant or unwilling to perform the sur-
gery.23 3 At the same time, however, many doctors oppose the
FDA moratorium and assert that women should have the "right
to choose" to undergo breast implant surgery.2 The American
Medical Association (AMA) has voiced support for women's right
to choose silicone or saline implants for augmentation or recon-
struction purposes after being fully informed of the risks and
benefits. 235 While this language of "choice" implies that doctors
are concerned about women's autonomy, the doctors' other ar-
guments against the moratorium belie their asserted confidence
in women's decision making ability. The ASPRS has speculated
that if silicone implants are not available, women will be afraid
to go to doctors when they find a lump in their breasts.23
Apparently, the ASPRS believes that women are at once capable
of deciding to undergo elective breast augmentation surgery, and
incapable of deciding to go to a doctor for medical need.
The AMA's "freedom of choice" argument for breast implant
surgery parallels that same organization's argument against Pres-
ident Clinton's health care reform plan. Although critics such as
the AMA and the insurance industry worry that the plan would
limit patients' choice of hospitals and doctors, at least half of all
Americans are already in plans that limit their choice.237 Analysts
say the choice issue is more a "hot button" than a meaningful
point of debate s
When doctors speak of the "right to choose" breast implant
surgery, it is often unclear whose choice they mean. Dr. Jack
Fisher, Assistant Clinical Professor of Plastic Surgery at Van-
233. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
234. Aschinger, supra note 119, at 411; Dianne Klein, Breast Implants: Taking Risky
Road to Higher Self-Esteem, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1991, at El.
235. John Schwartz, FDA and AMA Clash on Breast Implants, Kessler Berates Doctors'
Group for Taking 'Right to Choose' Stance, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1993, at A4; Breast
Implants: AMA Backs Continued Use of Devics, Prod. Liab. Daily (BNA), Dec. 31, 1992,
available in Westlaw, BNA-PLD database.
236. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, 102D CONG., 2D SESS., FDA's REG-
ULATION OF SILICONE BREAST IMPLANTS 26 (Comm. Print 1992).
237. Joan M. Mazzolini, What's to Choose? Health Care Already Limited, PLAIN DEALER,
Oct. 4, 1993, at lB.
238. See id.
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derbilt University, argues that women should be able to choose
silicone implants because the current alternatives are inadequate.
I should use the device that has the best shape, the best
contour. The only people who can judge that are my patients
and myself. What they (the FDA) are doing is preventing me
from giving my patients the best result I can. It's almost like
a bureaucrat coming in and saying to a sculptor, "This is how
you're going to make your sculpture."239
Clearly, the FDA's restrictions on the sale of breast implants
are based on concerns of safety, not aesthetics. Yet, Dr. Fisher's
Pygmalion-esque metaphor of the plastic surgeon as sculptor
unintentionally demonstrates the inherent assumptions and im-
plications of the beauty myth. If Dr. Fisher is the sculptor, then
the woman who is receiving the implant must be the stone.
Carrying the objectification of women to its literal extreme, Dr.
Fisher fails to acknowledge the critical difference between sur-
geon and sculptor: if the sculptor uses defective tools, no living,
breathing human being suffers.
IV. RECOMMENDATION AND POLICY
In order to account for the impact of male bias and the beauty
myth on the legal and medical systems,20 the breast implant
industry,2 1 and subsequent plaintiffs,A2 courts should find that
manufacturers of breast implants have a duty to warn users
directly of dangers associated with their product. Some courts
hold manufacturers of oral contraceptives or IUDs 243 to a duty
to warn users directly. The same policy rationales that support
a duty to warn oral contraceptive or IUD users directly exist in
the context of breast implants. Accordingly, courts should extend
this duty to breast implant manufacturers, and hold them liable
for failure to warn women users directly of a dangerous condition.
239. Glazer, supra note 85, at Z7 (alteration in original); see also FALUDI, supra note
183, at 215-16 (quoting Dr. Robert "the breast man of San Francisco" Harvey: "cosmetic
surgeons are sculptors").
240. See discussion supra part I.A.
241. See discussion supra part II.B.
242. See discussion supra part III.
243. N. Kathleen Strickland & John P. Katerndahl, Current Applications and Limita-
tions on the Learned Intermediary Rule, in Toxic TORT CASE ESSENTIALS: STRATEGIES,
EXPERTS, MOTIONS, AND ADR 259, 267-71 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. H446, 1992).
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A. The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Its Exceptions
Ordinarily, "a manufacturer of a product, which the manufac-
turer knows or should know is dangerous by nature or is in a
dangerous condition" is under a duty to give warning of those
dangers to "persons who it is foreseeable will come in contact
with, and consequently be endangered by, that product."24 If,
however, the manufacturer reasonably may rely upon an inter-
mediary to warn the user, the learned intermediary doctrine
absolves the manufacturer of its duty to warn the user directly.2 45
The learned intermediary doctrine applies to products classified
as prescription drugs or medical devices. The manufacturer's only
duty is to warn the prescribing physician. In prescription drug
cases, the prescribing physician acts as a "learned intermediary"
between the manufacturer and the patient, and "the duty of the
ethical drug manufacturer is to warn the doctor, rather than the
patient, [although] the manufacturer is directly liable to the
patient for a breach of such duty."PA6 Courts have analogized
medical devices to prescription drugs, and held the learned in-
termediary doctrine also applies to devices such as a heart
catheter247 and a cardiac pacemaker.4 1
Courts have expressed several interrelated reasons for the
learned intermediary doctrine:
(1) physicians, not patients, make the decisions as to whether
prescription drugs should be taken-hence patients have little
need for information about the risks and benefits of the drugs;
(2) to the extent patients are involved in such decisions, it is
the responsibility of the physician, not the drug company, to
provide patients with the necessary information under the
doctrine of "informed consent;" (3) if manufacturers provide
warnings directly to consumers, they could interfere with doc-
tor-patient relationships and deter patients from taking their
prescribed medications; and (4) it is too difficult to provide
warnings to consumers because the risks and benefits ... are
so varied, and so much depends on ... individual patients that
244. H.P. Hood & Sobs v. Ford Motor Co., 345 N.E.2d 683. 688 (Mass. 1976).
245. Carter v. Yardley & Co., 64 N.E.2d 693, 697 (Mass. 1946); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS S 388 cmt. n (1965).
246. McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 628 P.2d 522, 529 (Or. 1974) (footnote
omitted).
247. Phelps v. Sherwood Medical Indus., 836 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1987).
248. Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227 (4th Cir. 1984).
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the information cannot be meaningfully conveyed via a drug
label or package insert. 49
Some courts do not apply the learned intermediary rule in
cases involving oral contraceptives5 or IUDs. 2 1 Manufacturers
of these products must warn the patient directly of known dan-
gers.212 In MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,25 plaintiff
sued for damages from a stroke caused by defendant's birth
control pills. The court reasoned that the nature of "the pill"
warranted its exception from the learned intermediary rule:
in light of the heightened participation of patients in decisions
relating to use of "the pill"; the substantial risks affiliated with
the product's use; the feasibility of direct warnings by the
manufacturer to the user; the limited participation of the
physician ... and the possibility that oral communications be-
tween physicians and consumers may be insufficient ... to
apprise consumers of the product's dangers .
In Hill v. Searle Laboratories,255 the court extended the excep-
tion for oral contraceptives, a prescription drug, to the IUD, a
medical device. The court applied the same reasoning to IUDs
that other courts had applied to oral contraceptives: that the
patient, rather than the physician, decides to use an IUD; that
the product is marketed directly to consumers; that continuing
patient-doctor contact is infrequent; and that existing FDA re-
gulations require manufacturers to provide direct warnings to
patients.21
B. Current Application in Breast Implant Litigation
So far, courts have applied the learned intermediary doctrine
to breast implant litigation. The doctrine requires manufacturers
to warn the prescribing physician, rather than the medical pro-
249. Theresa Moran Schwartz, Esq., Consumer-Directed Prescription Drug Advertising
and the Learned Intermediary Rule, 46 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 829, 830 (1991) (citations
omitted).
250. MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 920 (1985).
251. Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989).
252. MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 70; Schwartz, supra note 249, at 833.
253. 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985).
254. Id. at 70.
255. 2884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989).
256. Schwartz, supra note 249, at 83434.
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fession generally.2 7 In Desmarais v. Dow Coring Corp.,2 the
plaintiff sued the manufacturer of her silicone implants after both
implants leaked into her breast tissue. 2 9 Defendant contended
that its duty under the learned intermediary doctrine was simply
to warn the medical profession as a whole060 The court held that
the manufacturer had a duty to warn the plaintiff's physician,
not merely the medical profession, about known dangers of its
breast implants. 26 1
At least one court has applied the learned intermediary doc-
trine to breast implant litigation brought under the theory of
inadequate warning.2 2 In Toole v. McClintock,m the plaintiff had
breast augmentation surgery and subsequently suffered from
capsular contracture.26 4 Her surgeon performed a closed capsu-
lotomy that caused the implant to rupture.2 5 In assessing the
plaintiff's claim that defendant's warning to her doctor was in-
adequate, the court held that "[u]nder the 'learned intermediary
doctrine,' the adequacy of [the manufacturer's] message is meas-
ured by its effect on the physician, ... not by its effect on [the
plaintiff]."2 66
Courts have classified breast implants as medical devices and
applied the learned intermediary doctrine. In Lee v. Baxter Health-
care Corp.,267 the plaintiff sued under theories of negligence, strict
liability, and breach of warranty after her breast implants rup-
tured.2 Plaintiff testified that "had she been warned of the
possibility of any complications, she would not have proceeded"
with the augmentation surgery.29 The court held that the man-
ufacturer had no duty to warn the plaintiff directly of the risks
associated with breast prostheses2 0 Rather, its only legal duty
was to warn the surgeon.2 1 The court reasoned that an implant,
like a heart catheter and a cardiac pacemaker, was properly
257. Desmarais v. Dow Corning Corp., 712 F. Supp. 13, 17 (D. Conn. 1989).
258. Id.
259. Id. at. 13-14.
260. Id. at 17.
261. Id. at 18.
262. Toole v. McClintock, 999 F.2d 1430 (11th Cir. 1993).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1431.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1433.
267. 721 F. Supp. 89 (D. Md. 1989), affid 898 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1990).
268. Id. at 90.
269. Id. at 91.
270. Id. at 94.
271. Id.
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classified as a medical device and subject to the learned inter-
mediary doctrine 7 2
Like other medical devices to which the learned intermediary
doctrine applies, breast implants may be sold only to a licensed
physician. In Perfetti v. McGhan Medical,2" plaintiff sued the
manufacturer of her saline solution and silicone gel implants after
the saline solution leaked from the left implant and the breast
deflated.274 On the plaintiff's claim for failure to warn, the court
reasoned that because the sale of implants was restricted to
doctors only, the learned intermediary doctrine should apply to
breast implants. "[A] manufacturer of a product ... which is
obtainable only through the services of a physician fulfills its
duty if it warns the physician of the dangers attendant upon its
use, and need not warn the patient as well."2 5
Perfetti and Lee can be distinguished. In Perfetti, the plaintiff
had previously undergone a mastectomy and her doctor recom-
mended the implants for medical reasons.2" In Lee, however, the
plaintiff had implants for augmentation purposes.2 Thus, the
plaintiff in Perfetti was in a similar circumstance to a patient
who receives a heart catheter or a cardiac pacemaker. On the
other hand, Lee was healthy at the time of her decision, and
thus more similar to the typical oral contraceptive user.
C. Why Courts Should Modify the Learned Intermediary Rule
for Breast Implant Litigation
Breast implants for augmentation purposes are more analogous
to birth control than to heart catheters or cardiac pacemakers.
Implants, like contraceptives, are chosen actively by the user.
Direct warnings to the user are not only feasible, but have been
required by the FDA since 1991. 278 Once the surgery is performed,
contact between patient and plastic surgeon is even more sporadic
than contact between patient and gynecologist. 279 Also, implants
272. Id. at 95.
273. 662 P.2d 646 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 662 P.2d 645 (N.M. 1983).
274. Id. at 648.
275. Id. at 650 (quoting Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975, 979 (Wash. 1978)).
276. Id. at 648.
277. Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 F. Supp. 89, 91 (D. Md. 1989).
278. Breast Implants: FDA Orders Makers to Give Doctors Information on Risks to Pass
on to Patients, Prod. Liab. Daily (BNA), Oct. 15, 1991, available in Westlaw, BNA-PLD
database.
279. MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 69 (Mass.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 920 (1985) (citing to J. WILLSON ET AL., OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 184 (7th ed.
1983); D. DANFORTH, OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 267 (4th ed. 1982); T. GREEN, GYNECOL-
OGY: ESSENTIALS OF CLINICAL PRACTICE 593 (3d ed. 1977)).
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and contraceptives are less therapeutic in nature than heart
catheters or cardiac pacemakers. Thus, the exception to the
learned intermediary rule created in MacDonald should extend
to breast implants chosen for cosmetic purposes.
Phillips v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.20 is a good case example
of why and how courts should extend the exception to the learned
intermediary doctrine to breast implant cases. In Phillips, the
plaintiff underwent breast augmentation surgery with defen-
dant's silicone implants and subsequently experienced three suc-
cessive capsular contractures. ' Her doctor performed a closed
capsulotomy to correct the second capsular contracture. Later
her right implant ruptured. while she was reading a book and
"rolled over onto her stomach and felt a 'popping' in her chest."' 2
Plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that defendant breached its duty to
warn of implant rupture and that the silicone used had a low
viscosity which made it more likely to" migrate to other parts of
her body.2 The court held that breast implants did not present
a "special circumstance" which would warrant an exception to
the learned intermediary doctrine.2 Furthermore, the court did
not "accept that breast augmentation patients are more actively
involved in the use of the medical device than patients who
'passively' ingest pharmaceuticals."'' 5 Finally, the court held that
"[t]he physician is in the superior position to evaluate product
risks and side effects, not the patient. The licensed physician is,
in effect, the consumer."?' 6
What the court did not discuss is at least as interesting as
what it did. The court, for example, did not distinguish between
a healthy woman who elects breast augmentation surgery for
nonmedical reasons and a prescription drug user for whom a
physician prescribes the drug specifically for medical reasons. In
effect the court did not examine whether a warning to the
plaintiff would have affected her decision to undergo surgery in
the first place, but focused on whether a warning would have
changed her use of the product. Thus, the court could not "accept
that breast augmentation patients are more actively involved in
280. No. B061926, 1993 WL 524688 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 1993).
281. Id. at *1.
282. Id.
283. Id. at *2.
284. Id. at *6-*7.
285. Id. at *7.
286. Id. (citing Rosburg v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 226 Cal. Rptr. 299, 303 (Ct.
App. 1986)).
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the use of the medical device than patients who 'passively' ingest
pharmaceuticals. ' 81
Arguing for direct warnings to the user, the plaintiff raised
the issue that breast implant users may be treated by different
doctors who are not aware of the brand of implant or specific
warnings accompanying that particular brand. The court stated
that it "seem[ed] obvious that it would be inappropriate for the
manufacturer to warn the patient and then rely on the patient
to deliver those warnings to the subsequent physician" The
court, however, did not consider that an adequate warning to
the intended user could influence her decision to use the product
in the first place. Moreover, the court did not address why the
manufacturer could not warn both the physician and the user. In
situations in which the court chooses to characterize the consumer
and the user as two different parties, perhaps two warnings are
the most "obvious" solution.
V. CONCLUSION
Male bias within the legal and medical systems disadvantages
women mass tort plaintiffs by increasing the probability of harm
and decreasing the probability of full recovery. When the litiga-
tion involves a beauty product, such as silicone breast implants,
the beauty myth further impedes recovery by influencing the
plaintiff's assessment of the product's utility, and by inviting the
fact finder to make inappropriate considerations of the plaintiff's
conduct. Regardless of whether the breast implant industry ac-
tively or intentionally used the beauty myth to increase profits,
both manufacturers and surgeons benefitted from the beauty
myth, and, at the same time, perpetuated it. To this extent, the
legal system should consider the role of the beauty myth in the
resulting breast implant litigation.
Given the predictions that the settlement offer by the major
manufacturers will cover only about one-fourth of current claims,
a substantial amount of breast implant litigation will remain in
the courts. Thus, courts still have an opportunity to find a just
result. To this end, they should hold manufacturers to a duty to
warn implant users directly and allow plaintiffs to bypass the
learned intermediary doctrine in failure to warn claims.
287. Id. (emphasis added).
288. Id.
